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ARTICLE 
Accurate Economics to Protect Endangered 
Species and their Critical Habitats 
JACOB P. BYL* 
Federal agencies currently use a methodology that finds 
negligible benefits of protecting critical habitat for endangered 
species, despite the prime real estate that is often involved. The 
Endangered Species Act already calls for economic analysis, but 
agencies currently treat it as a meaningless hoop to jump through. 
Agencies justify this hollow exercise by pointing to the difficulty in 
quantifying the increment of added protection that comes with 
critical habitat designation. However, the increment of added 
protection for critical habitat can be measured using methods 
already employed by agencies in other environmental analyses. 
Although the central benefits of critical habitat are improvements 
to the condition of listed species, accurate economic analysis 
should also consider the broad benefits of ecosystem services that 
flow from protected areas to human populations. I propose that 
agencies use a methodology that weighs the estimated burdens on 
regulated parties against the estimated benefits of designating 
lands as critical habitat. My proposed—more accurate—analysis 
can lead to more effective implementation of the Endangered 
Species Act by allowing agencies to target limited resources to 
projects that offer high net conservation benefits. I use a recent 
cost-benefit analysis for loggerhead turtles to demonstrate that the 
benefits of conserving habitat include increased protection of the 
species as well as a larger flow of ecosystem services amounting to 
at least $106 million per year in benefits, not the $0 estimate that 
federal agencies have arrived at. Accurate economic analysis 
 
*  Assistant Professor of Economics at Western Kentucky University, 1906 
College Heights Blvd. #11059, Bowling Green, KY 42101-1059 (e-mail: 
jacob.byl@wku.edu). I would like to thank J.B. Ruhl, Kip Viscusi, Cindy 
Kam, Kathy Anderson, and Owen Jones for valuable comments. 
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provides useful information to agencies and the public in a way 
that can improve discussions that are often one-sided because of 
an emphasis on regulatory costs with little discussion of 
regulatory benefits. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The beaches of Cape Hatteras stretch for miles. Strips of 
natural sand flank rolling dunes that offer countless vistas of 
ocean and shore. The beautiful coastal islands in North Carolina 
are a destination for sun-seeking vacationers from across the 
United States. The beaches of Cape Hatteras also attract another 
type of visitor: loggerhead turtles travel hundreds of miles to lay 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/4
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their eggs in the sand of these beaches. In fact, without sandy 
beaches like these, sea turtles are unable to reproduce. And sea 
turtles are not the only nonhuman residents at Cape Hatteras—
the complex ecosystem where the ocean meets the shore is 
essential to a wide array of species. Yet according to a recent 
economic analysis commissioned by the National Marine 
Fisheries Service, the benefits of designating Cape Hatteras as 
critical habitat for the loggerhead turtle are difficult to measure, 
but approximately zero.1 And the analysis covers more than the 
coastal islands of North Carolina—most of the ocean beaches in 
the southeast United States, from Cape Hatteras down to Key 
West, Florida and over to Gulf Shores, Alabama are estimated to 
provide zero benefits as critical habitat.2 As described below, 
current agency practice does not provide useful information to the 
agency or to the public—an analysis that shows no meaningful 
benefits or costs of designating a good portion of the East Coast 
oceanfront property as critical habitat is not an accurate 
economic analysis. 
In this Article, I describe how proper economic tools can help 
protect critical habitat for endangered species while lowering 
burdens on regulated parties. The use of economic tools is called 
for in the current language of the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”), so agencies can embrace the move toward more effective 
regulations without waiting for Congress to amend the statute. In 
this Article, I call for the agencies implementing the ESA to make 
the move to more accurate economic analysis by quantifying the 
real costs and benefits of critical habitat designation. In doing so, 
agencies should recognize that protections for loggerhead turtles 
are about more than the turtles—benefits of critical habitat stem 
from protecting the surrounding ecosystem as well as from the 
endangered species itself. 
The ESA is a powerful environmental law that was passed in 
1973 with the purpose of protecting “the ecosystems upon which 
endangered species and threatened species depend.”3 To achieve 
 
1.   INDUS. ECON., INC., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL HABITAT DESIGNATION 
OF MARINE HABITAT FOR THE NORTHWEST ATLANTIC OCEAN DISTINCT 
POPULATION SEGMENT OF THE LOGGERHEAD TURTLE 7-2 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/X93G-GAE3 [hereinafter LOGGERHEAD ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS]. 
2.   See id. at 6-15. 
3.   16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2018). 
3
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this purpose, Congress delegated authority to the Fish and 
Wildlife Service (“FWS”) (within the Department of the Interior) 
and the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) (within the 
Department of Commerce) to regulate public and private parties 
that engage in activities that affect endangered and threatened 
species.4 The FWS and NMFS work to protect imperiled species 
by going through regulatory steps to determine whether the 
species warrant protection by being listed as endangered or 
threatened. For species that are listed, the agencies implement 
the statutory provisions that provide legal protections to 
threatened and endangered species. One of the major regulatory 
steps that the FWS and NMFS take to protect listed species is to 
designate critical habitat for those species. Critical habitat 
designation is done by the FWS and NMFS “on the basis of the 
best scientific data available and after taking into consideration 
the economic impact, the impact on national security, and any 
other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical 
habitat.”5 
The requirement to take “into consideration the economic 
impact” of critical habitat designation differs from the section of 
the ESA that calls for the FWS and NMFS to list species as 
endangered or threatened based “solely on the best scientific 
data . . . available.”6 The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted 
“best scientific data available” to mean that economic analysis 
should not have any role in the listing decision.7 So the FWS and 
NMFS are charged with listing species as endangered or 
threatened without engaging in economic analysis but are 
supposed to consider economic factors when designating critical 
habitat. 
 
4.   See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (2018). The FWS has authority over species on 
land and in freshwater. The NMFS has authority over marine species. The 
two agencies have joint authority over species that spend part of their time 
in marine environments and part of their time on land or in freshwater. 
See Species Information, NOAA FISHERIES, https://perma.cc/N4R2-VXT6 
(last updated Jan. 29, 2018).   
5.   16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2018). 
6.   16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2018). 
7.   See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184–88 (1978) (discussing 
that Congress “viewed the value of endangered species as ‘incalculable’” 
and enacted the ESA to combat species extinction, “whatever the cost”). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/4
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Thus far, FWS and NMFS have performed economic analysis 
of critical habitat designation by looking at the change from the 
“baseline” of protections for listed species.8 In practice, this has 
led to economic analysis that weighs low benefits against low 
costs because the protections afforded by critical habitat largely 
overlap with the protections for listed species. In most cases, the 
FWS and NMFS estimate benefits of proposed critical habitat as 
zero and costs as limited to some thousands of dollars per year for 
administrative costs.9 Commentators, such as Professor Amy 
Sinden, have argued that a lack of extensive economic analysis is 
a good thing because more elaborate weighing of costs and 
benefits of critical habitat would use agency resources and may 
result in regulatory paralysis.10 
I propose that more accurate economic analysis of critical 
habitat designation should instead weigh the broad benefits 
against the real costs of critical habitat. There are two main 
reasons why economic analysis should play more of a role in 
critical habitat decisions. First, statutory interpretation of the 
ESA points to a Congressional intent that would be best fulfilled 
with more accurate economic analysis. I define accurate economic 
analysis as the weighing of costs against benefits of proposed 
regulations, with measurements of costs and benefits that reflect 
social values of the expected changes due to the proposed policies. 
In Part II, I discuss statutory interpretation of the ESA to 
attempt to discern the intent of Congress when it comes to the 
role of economic analysis in critical habitat designation. 
The second reason why economic analysis should play a more 
active role in the process of designating critical habitat is that 
accurate economic analysis can enable ESA regulations to be 
more efficient, allowing for more conservation with lower burdens 
on regulated parties. In Part III, I describe how cost-benefit 
analysis can help lead to win-win results by encouraging more 
effective ESA regulations. The expertise of economists can 
contribute to the protection of endangered species by focusing 
 
8.   50 C.F.R. § 424.19 (2018). 
9.   See LOGGERHEAD ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 3-17, 7-2. 
10.  Amy Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less is More in 
the Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 129, 134 (2004). 
5
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agency resources on the most promising actions that have the 
highest net benefits to society. 
In Part IV, I turn to methodology for accurately measuring 
costs and benefits of critical habitat under the ESA. I pay 
particular attention to measuring benefits, which tend to be more 
nebulous and difficult to pin down. The current agency estimates 
of zero benefits and low costs for critical habitat do not accurately 
reflect social preferences. People value preserving rare species 
but also value the benefits that flow from the areas protected as 
critical habitat. The most promising way to measure these 
benefits is by quantifying the values of ecosystem services like 
water filtration, carbon sequestration, and recreational 
opportunities. I argue that the best methodology for measuring 
benefits of critical habitat is to add together the values people 
place on: 1) the expected improvements to listed species due to 
the critical habitat designation and 2) the value of the ecosystem 
services that are also protected due to the critical habitat 
designation. 
In Part V, I provide an example of how to implement my 
proposed economic analysis using the recent economic analysis 
for critical habitat designation of the Northwest Atlantic 
population segment of the loggerhead turtle. As in most recent 
agency analyses, the estimates provided by NMFS in this 
analysis are of zero benefits and low costs. By using published 
estimates of the values of loggerhead turtles and ecosystem 
services that are likely protected by the proposed critical habitat, 
I estimate benefits that more accurately reflect the values people 
place on the proposed action of designating critical habitat along 
a major portion of the East Coast of the United States. 
In Part VI, I conclude by discussing how more accurate 
economic analysis of critical habitat designation has the potential 
to change the dynamics of the oft-lively debate between 
supporters and opponents of the ESA. With things like timber 
harvests and construction development at play, there are billions 
of dollars of economic activity at stake.11 Industries that face 
regulation under the ESA are quick to discuss how much 
economic value is lost from restrictions on timber harvest in the 
 
11.  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: SAVING HABITATS, 
PROTECTING HOMES 135 (Jason Shogren ed., 1999) [hereinafter PRIVATE 
PROPERTY & THE ESA]. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/4
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Pacific Northwest, solar power in the Mojave desert, or water 
distribution in California.12 These quantified estimates lead to 
press coverage and statistics quoted on Capitol Hill.13 On the 
other side of the conservation debate, proponents of more 
stringent endangered species protections talk mostly in moral 
terms about the importance of protecting species like the grey 
wolf and Karner blue butterfly.14 Although these justifications for 
conservation resonate with some audiences, moral arguments 
tend to provide few quotable statistics and get less press 
coverage. By engaging in more accurate economic analysis, the 
FWS and NMFS can help reframe the debate by providing 
credible statistics for both sides. 
At the heart of the endangered species controversies are 
difficult tradeoffs between conserving rare ecosystems and 
developing resources in ways that affect quality of life for millions 
of people. By sidestepping these tradeoffs in economic analysis, 
the agencies implementing the ESA miss out on an opportunity to 
target conservation efforts more effectively. Economic analysis 
can help the agencies improve the effectiveness of conservation 
efforts in ways that lead to win-win situations compared with the 
current regime. Accurate economic analyses can foster more 
balanced discussions of conservation controversies in ways that 
allow for better public involvement and, ultimately, more 
effective endangered species protections. 
II. INTERPRETING THE ESA’S CALL FOR 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
The ESA requires economic analysis for critical habitat 
designation, and the current practices of the agencies that 
 
12.   See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059 
(9th Cir. 2004) (Northern spotted owls); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. 
Bureau of Land Mgmt., 746 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (desert 
tortoises); In re Consol. Delta Smelt Cases, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (E.D. Cal. 
2011) (delta smelt). 
13.   See, e.g., Philip Shabecoff, Ideas and Trends; The Battle for the National 
Forests, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 1989) https://perma.cc/D4VW-L57C 
(reporting on expected costs of spotted owl regulations); see also 111 CONG. 
REC. 5964 (2010) (power company executives testifying about the 
quantified costs of endangered species regulation for H.R. 221). 
14.   See Protecting Imperiled Species, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, 
https://perma.cc/A682-KFNU.  
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implement the ESA follow the letter, rather than the spirit, of the 
law. This Part considers different interpretations of the ESA and 
finds that the one that best fits Congress’s intent is to have the 
FWS and NMFS engage in cost-benefit analysis that considers 
the broad benefits and real costs of critical habitat designations. 
A. The Statute and Context 
The ESA was passed in 1973 to provide “a means whereby 
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened 
species depend may be conserved” and to “provide a program for 
the conservation of such endangered species and threatened 
species.”15 The ESA requires agencies to use the “best scientific 
and commercial data available” when determining whether to list 
species as threatened or endangered.16 In Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this language 
signified that Congress did not intend for agencies to consider 
economic factors when deciding whether to list species under the 
ESA.17 Congress endorsed this interpretation of the ESA by 
adding “solely” in front of “scientific and commercial data” to 
make it clear that the listing decision for species should not 
include economic factors.18 
Congress was also sensitive to the backlash against the 
decision in Tennessee Valley Authority because many people saw 
it as wasteful to prevent use of the nearly completed $100 million 
Tellico dam for the sake of a commercially worthless fish.19 So 
Congress passed a law explicitly exempting the Tellico dam from 
the ESA and started engaging in discussions about how the ESA 
should be amended.20 In 1978, Congress amended the ESA to 
require the implementing agencies to designate critical habitat 
based on the “best scientific data available and after taking into 
 
15.  16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2018). 
16.   16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2018). 
17.   Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184–85 (1978). 
18.  Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 
§ 2(a)(2), 96 Stat. 1411, 1411 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(b)(1)(A) (2018)); H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 12 (1982). 
19.   See James Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat Under 
the Endangered Species Act, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 318–19, 321 
(1990).  
20.   Id. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/4
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consideration the economic impact . . . of specifying any particular 
area as critical habitat.”21 The 1978 amendments to the ESA also 
added a committee that has authority to exempt certain activities 
from ESA regulations to prevent drastic outcomes like that in 
Tennessee Valley Authority.22 This “God Squad” committee is 
usually described as an escape valve intended to prevent repeats 
of the Tellico dam situation.23 
B. Agency and Court Interpretations 
As it has stood for over thirty years, the ESA allows for no 
role of economic analysis in the process of listing a species as 
threatened or endangered, but the statute requires the FWS and 
NMFS to engage in economic analysis when designating critical 
habitat of listed species.24 The FWS and NMFS have interpreted 
“taking into consideration the economic impact” in critical habitat 
designation as a call for analysis of the additional protections of 
critical habitat designation over the protections afforded to listed 
species.25 Species listed as endangered or threatened are 
protected from “take” by any person or organization and from 
“jeopardy” by federal agencies.26 The FWS and NMFS consider 
these protections to be a baseline, since economic factors are not 
supposed to be considered at the listing stage.27 Critical habitat 
adds a protection that federal agencies may not engage in 
“adverse modification of habitat . . . that is deemed to be 
critical.”28 As defined by the agencies in regulations, the 
prohibitions on take and jeopardy almost completely overlap with 
the adverse modification protection of critical habitat.29 Using 
this interpretation of the statute, economic analysis is 
implemented using an “incremental” approach that looks at the 
 
21.   16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2018) (emphasis added). 
22.   Id. § 1536(e). 
23.   Salzman, supra note 19, at 321. 
24.   16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2018). 
25.   Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revisions to the 
Regulations for Impact Analyses of Critical Habitat, 78 Fed. Reg. 53,058, 
53,062 (Aug. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Critical Habitat Regulations 
Revisions]. 
26.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2), 1538(a)(1)(B) (2018).  
27.  Critical Habitat Regulations Revisions, 78 Fed. Reg. at 53,062. 
28.   16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2018). 
29.  50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2018). 
9
  
2018] Accurate Economics to Protect Endangered Species 317 
benefits and costs of the added protections of critical habitat over 
the protections that come from listing a species as endangered or 
threatened.30 
As a practical matter, the incremental approach leads to a 
narrow concept of costs and benefits because there is usually no 
additional increment of legal protection for critical habitat that 
was not already covered by the take and jeopardy protections of 
listing.31 Costs are usually limited to the administrative costs of 
handling critical habitat.32 Benefits are usually negligible and 
often left unquantified but, when quantified, are usually zero.33 
From a logistical standpoint, this allows the FWS and NMFS to 
avoid using extensive agency resources on economic analysis.34 
The incremental approach to cost-benefit analysis was 
challenged in New Mexico Cattle Growers Association v. U.S. Fish 
& Wildlife Service, prompting the Tenth Circuit to review the 
FWS’s interpretation of the call for economic analysis in the 
ESA.35 In New Mexico Cattle Growers, the court rejected the 
agency’s incremental approach for taking too narrow a view of the 
costs and benefits of critical habitat.36 According to the New 
Mexico Cattle Growers court, the narrow costs and benefits 
implied by the incremental approach went against Congress’ 
intent for the FWS to use economic analysis for critical habitat 
designation.37 The FWS interpretation was not afforded 
substantial deference because the policy had not been 
implemented through notice-and-comment rulemaking.38 
 
30.   Id. § 424.19(b). 
31.   See Sinden, supra note 10, at 151. The one scenario in which critical 
habitat may add an additional layer of protection over listing protections is 
when areas that do not currently serve as habitat for listed species are 
designated as critical habitat for those species. This could be the case if 
part of the historic range of a species is designated even though it is not 
currently inhabited by the species. The FWS and NMFS avoid doing this to 
prevent added controversy. Id. 
32.   See, e.g., LOGGERHEAD ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 5-1. 
33.   See, e.g., id. at 7-2. 
34.   See Sinden, supra note 10, at 208. 
35. See generally New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1283–85 (10th Cir. 2001). 
36.  Id. at 1285. 
37.   Id. 
38.   Id. at 1281. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/4
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However, in Arizona Cattle Growers Association v. Salazar, 
the Ninth Circuit upheld FWS’s use of the incremental approach 
as a permissible reading of the ESA.39 When the Arizona Cattle 
Growers court interpreted the ESA, it found the incremental 
approach to be a permissible reading of the statute’s call for 
economic analysis.40 So judicial reviews of the agency 
interpretation of economic analysis in the ESA have gone both 
ways, leading to a patchwork of permissible economic analysis for 
endangered species that required different methodologies in 
Arizona and New Mexico.41 
In an attempt to achieve a uniform national policy, the FWS 
and NMFS promulgated a joint rule in 2013 officially interpreting 
the ESA and used the “incremental” approach with narrowly 
defined costs and benefits.42 The new policy was promulgated by 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, so it will presumably receive 
deference under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
which stands for the idea that courts defer to reasonable agency 
interpretations when those interpretations were made with the 
force of law.43 This means that the New Mexico Cattle Growers 
case would likely come out differently today because the court 
would give substantial deference to the agency now that the 
incremental approach has gone through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.44 Although the FWS and NMFS have used 
rulemaking to interpret the ESA to call for economic analysis 
using the incremental approach, that does not have to be the end 
of the discussion; there are multiple perspectives on the statutory 
 
39.   See generally Arizona Cattle Growers Association v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 
1160, 1173 (9th Cir. 2010). 
40.   Id. at 1174. 
41.   Id. at 1073 (describing the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the Tenth Circuit’s 
holding). Arizona is in the Ninth Circuit, so the FWS would be allowed to 
use the incremental approach there. New Mexico is in the Tenth Circuit, so 
the FWS could not use the incremental approach in the neighboring state. 
This can be a major problem for the FWS when trying to designate critical 
habitat for species that cross state lines in those circuits. 
42.   Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revisions to the 
Regulations for Impact Analyses of Critical Habitat, 78 Fed. Reg. 53,058 
(Aug. 28, 2013) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 424). 
43.  See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
44. See New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 
F.3d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 2001). 
11
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language, and the agencies could opt to promulgate new rules 
with different interpretations in the future. 
C. Interpretations by Commentators 
Various commentators outside the agencies and courts have 
also interpreted the ESA’s call for economic analysis of critical 
habitat designation. Many environmental advocates have 
interpreted the economic analysis provision along the lines of the 
incremental approach and have applauded the evasion of more 
involved cost-benefit analysis, as they see the lack of economic 
analysis in the ESA as one of the law’s strengths in protecting the 
environment.45 In this view, the incremental approach allows the 
agencies to bypass costly analysis that is often a hurdle for new 
regulations to cross.46 Resources that would have to be spent 
putting prices on things that are inherently valuable can instead 
be used to “put boots on the ground” to actively conserve listed 
species. 
Professor Amy Sinden argues that it is desirable for the 
agencies to use “short-cut environmental standards” for economic 
analysis so that cost-benefit analysis does not have to play a role 
in the ESA.47  Examples of short-cut methods include feasibility 
standards and limited balancing tests found in the Clean Air Act 
and Clean Water Act.48 Sinden argues that Congress intended 
these short-cut methods in lieu of formal cost-benefit analysis.49 
The ESA calls for “consideration [of] . . . economic impact” and 
also charges the FWS and NMFS to consider other relevant 
factors “based on such data as may be available at the time.”50 
Sinden reads this language as an intent to give the agencies 
implementing the law substantial flexibility in how they engage 
in economic analysis of critical habitat designation so that the 
agencies can act quickly.51 Formal economic analysis uses 
 
45. See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 10, at 159 (describing environmental groups’ 
successful legal challenges to FWS’s declining to designate critical habitat 
based on cost-benefit analysis). 
46.   See id. 
47.   Id. at 184–87. 
48.   Id. at 186, 188–92. 
49.  See id. at 210. 
50.   16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2), (6)(C)(ii) (2018). 
51.   See Sinden, supra note 10, at 193–94. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/4
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substantial resources and is often cited as an excuse for 
administrative paralysis, so Professor Sinden prefers an ESA that 
retains an element of absolutist methods to achieve its goals.52 
In a similar vein, Jon Souder traces the use of economic 
analysis for ESA regulations and proposes that critical habitat 
designation should go through the public comment process 
spelled out in the National Environmental Protection Act.53 
Souder argues that this public involvement is preferable to formal 
cost-benefit analysis of endangered species regulations.54 
D. The Closest Fit to Congressional Intent 
The current agency interpretation takes the prohibition on 
economic analysis for listing species as a signal to start the 
economic analysis of critical habitat designation from a baseline 
with the species already listed and protected through those legal 
mechanisms.55 But the relationship between listing and 
designating critical habitat is more complex than baseline 
protections and additional protections.56 Designating critical 
habitat is required for listed species.57 There are many overlaps 
in the protections, and the legal protections of critical habitat are 
often the ones that have bite in practice.58 
When Congress included the requirement for agencies to 
consider economic factors in the critical habitat designation 
process, it is unlikely that the added requirement was intended to 
be a hollow bureaucratic hurdle.59 If Congress intended economic 
analysis the way the FWS and NMFS interpret it, then the 
requirement to consider economic factors is surplusage—at least 
 
52.   See id. at 192–94. 
53.   See Jon A. Souder, Chasing Armadillos Down Yellow Lines: Economics in 
the Endangered Species Act, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1095, 1097–98, 1109, 
1112–13, 1138 (1993) (arguing that the public comment process 
established under NEPA should be used for critical habitat designation to 
supplement a weak cost-benefit analysis). 
54.   Id. at 1138. 
55.   See LOGGERHEAD ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 2-7. 
56.   See Salzman, supra note 19, at 321–23. 
57.   16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (2018). 
58.   See Salzman, supra note 19, at 323–27. 
59.   See generally id. at 316–21 (describing public outcry in the wake of TVA v. 
Hill and Congress’s adoption of cost-benefit analysis for critical-habitat 
designation in response). 
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for practical purposes. This is because an economic analysis that 
weighs no benefits against almost no costs for all proposed critical 
habitat designations does not provide helpful insight into any of 
those designations; when there is no variation across proposed 
designations, there is nothing informative about whether some 
proposals are preferable to others.60 
In the wake of Tennessee Valley Authority, it is more likely 
that Congress intended to amend the ESA by adding a method to 
address the important tradeoff between conservation and 
economic development.61 The requirement to consider economic 
factors when designating critical habitat can serve, like the “God 
Squad,” as an escape valve from drastic outcomes like the Tellico 
Dam.62 
Congressional intent behind the call for economic analysis in 
critical habitat designation under the ESA can be discerned by 
considering the context of the 1978 amendments to the ESA and 
the timeline of agency actions. In the wake of Tennessee Valley 
Authority, Congress was explicit about economic analysis not 
playing a role in the listing process that, as described above, 
affords protections to species against take and agency actions 
that involve jeopardy.63 At the same time, Congress explicitly 
called for economic analysis of critical habitat designation, which 
protects against agency actions that may adversely modify 
habitat.64 
The FWS and NMFS have interpreted jeopardy and adverse 
modification to mean similar things, although that is not the only 
 
60.   See New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 
F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2001) (describing economic analysis done under 
the baseline approach as “rendered essentially without meaning . . . “ 
because the agencies defined critical-habitat protection against adverse 
modification as fully encompassed by listing protection against jeopardy 
for all species). 
61.   See id. at 320–21 (noting that the cost-benefit provision “changed the 
designation process from a purely biological assessment to a social policy 
decision” and that the newly created “God Squad” could exempt projects 
from § 7 if it determines, inter alia, that the action’s societal benefits 
outweigh the costs of species preservation).  
62.   See id. 
63.   Id. at 323. 
64.   16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2018). 
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reasonable interpretation of those terms.65 But even taking those 
terms as identical, it could still make sense for Congress to 
simultaneously call for no economic analysis when listing species 
yet for meaningful economic analysis when designating critical 
habitat. If Congress felt that economic factors were important but 
should be considered at a later stage and should focus on agency 
behavior, it would make sense to exempt listing from economic 
analysis but call for it in critical habitat designation. This 
interpretation avoids the need to perform economic analysis 
before listing, which might be important when the agency is 
trying to quickly protect a species, such as after an imperiled 
species has just been discovered and is under great threat.66 Once 
species have some protections in place, Congress may have 
wanted the agencies to then turn to economic factors. Focusing on 
federal agency behavior also allows the FWS and NMFS to 
sidestep trying to quantify some of the thorny issues involved in 
private landowner restrictions.67 Under this reading of the ESA, 
when rare species are discovered they are quickly listed and 
receive legal protections while the agencies engage in scientific 
research to determine the conservation needs of the species. The 
FWS and NMFS then decide where to designate critical habitat, 
which has a direct impact on federal agencies but not on private 
landowners, based on economic factors. 
As mentioned above, Professor Sinden has argued for the 
benefits of eschewing cost-benefit analysis when designating 
critical habitat in favor of short-cut environmental standards.68 
However, Professor Sinden’s interpretation fails to give full effect 
to Congress’s call for economic analysis. The language that she 
cites as “evidencing Congress’s conscious decision to choose 
prompt agency action over regulatory perfection”69 is in a portion 
of the statute that describes a one-year delay in implementation 
 
65.   See New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass’n, 248 F.3d at 1285. One could easily 
imagine definitions of jeopardy and adverse modification that differ in 
levels of protection, which types of species are targeted, or other 
substantive differences. 
66.   This was essentially the situation with the snail darter fish that held up 
operation of the Tellico Dam in Tenn. Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 
(1978). 
67.   See PRIVATE PROPERTY & THE ESA, supra note 11, at 55. 
68.   See Sinden, supra note 10, at 196–97. 
69.   Id. at 194. 
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of the law to give FWS and NMFS an opportunity to meet the 
statutory deadlines for critical habitat designation.70 Thus, the 
charge that the FWS “must publish a final regulation[ ] based on 
such data as may be available at the time”71 is not strong 
evidence that Congress intended for the agencies to always prefer 
regulatory speed to regulatory effectiveness. Following the 
principle that courts should interpret statutory terms “in 
connection with . . . the whole statute,”72 it is natural to read 
language in that portion of the statute about a one-year delay as 
describing how the agencies should proceed during the one-year 
delay. Taking language from that portion of the statute and 
applying it to other sections of the ESA is stripping it of the 
context of commanding agencies how to implement the law 
during its nascent year. 
Additionally, the language describing the criteria for critical-
habitat designation is very similar to the language that describes 
the criteria for listing species.73 When considering this language 
within the whole ESA, there is a conflict if the language indicates 
Congress’s intent for short-cut economic analysis of critical 
habitat designation—which is Professor Sinden’s preferred 
interpretation—but Congress uses the same language to show 
that there should be no role for economic analysis in the listing 
process.74 The U.S. Supreme Court, endorsed by Congress, has 
read the language in the listing process to mean that economics 
has no role in the listing decision, so it would be incongruous to 
have similar language used as a signal for short-cut economic 
analysis. 
Interpreting “consideration of economic factors” in the ESA 
as a call for cost-benefit analysis is a better way to give effect to 
the intent of Congress to use economic tools as a factor in the 
decision to designate critical habitat. As discussed above, the 
current agency interpretation—the incremental approach—does 
not lead to economic analysis being a meaningful factor in critical 
 
70.   16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2018). 
71.   Id. 
72.   Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 16 (2008) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194 (1856)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
73.   Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (establishing the species listing criteria) 
with 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (establishing the critical-habitat designation 
criteria). 
74.   See discussion supra Part II. 
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habitat decisions because the results are always estimates of 
costs that are relatively low administrative costs weighed against 
approximately zero benefits.75 It is unlikely that Congress 
intended this result when it called for economic analysis. Instead, 
congressional intent points to a need for more accurate economic 
analysis. By measuring costs and benefits using estimates of how 
much people trade off environmental amenities for other things 
like money, the agency is able to pursue regulatory policies that 
best reflect societal values.76 With accurate measurements of 
costs and benefits, economic analysis can serve as the escape 
valve that Congress likely had in mind in the wake of the Tellico 
Dam experience.77 In addition to following with the intent of 
Congress, more accurate economic analysis can improve over the 
current approach by leading toward more effective ESA 
regulations. 
E. How to Measure the Increment 
Accurate economic analysis requires a way to measure the 
costs and benefits of critical habitat designation in relation to the 
protections against take and jeopardy that come from the listing 
of species. The current agency methodology assumes that the 
increment of protection for critical habitat is essentially zero 
because the adverse modification protection completely overlaps 
with either the Section 7 protection against jeopardy, the Section 
9 protection against take, or both.78 However, there are other 
ways to measure the increment of protection from adverse 
modification that would give meaning to the language Congress 
included in the ESA to consider economic factors of critical 
habitat designation. 
1. Nonoverlapping Protection of Adverse Modification 
Courts have hypothesized that there can be scenarios in 
which critical habitat designation provides protections for species 
 
75.  See Sinden, supra note 10, at 196–97. 
76.  NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CHARLES C. CALDART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 
POLICY, AND ECONOMICS 148 (2008). 
77.  Salzman, supra note 19, at 320–21. 
78.  See New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 
F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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that would not come from jeopardy and take protections.79 When 
areas are considered “essential to the conservation” of listed 
species, but those areas are not currently inhabited by the 
species, there may be an increment of protection added by 
designating that land as critical habitat.80 FWS and NMFS 
acknowledge this possibility in economic analyses, even when 
they choose not to designate any land that is not currently 
occupied by the species.81 By doing this, the agencies are able to 
pay tribute to the idea that Congress intended for meaningful 
economic analysis of critical-habitat designation, but argue that it 
does not apply in this particular designation. But as this appears 
to have become standard procedure for the agencies,82 
congressional intent for economic analysis of critical habitat 
designation is still not being met with meaningful agency action. 
2. Adverse Modification Protection in Isolation 
The New Mexico Cattle Growers court required FWS to 
measure costs and benefits of critical habitat even if those costs 
and benefits also accrued from the protections for listed species.83 
This essentially asks the agencies to pretend that jeopardy and 
take protections do not exist and measure how critical habitat 
 
79.  See Cape Hatteras Access Pres. All. v. Dep’t of Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d 
108, 129-30 (D.D.C. 2004). 
80.   See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) (2018) (defining “critical habitat” to include 
“areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species . . . upon a 
determination by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the 
conservation of the species”). 
81.  See, e.g. INDUS. ECON., INC., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL HABITAT 
DESIGNATION FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL 8-13 (2012), 
https://perma.cc/5CV6-Z2EV [hereinafter NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL 
ANALYSIS]; CARDNO ENTRIX, DRAFT REGULATORY IMPACT REVIEW OF CRITICAL 
HABITAT DESIGNATION FOR THE ARTIC RINGED SEAL (2014), 
https://perma.cc/6AA8-PT7U. But see Markle Interests, LLC v. U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Service, 827 F.3d 452, 459 (5th Cir. 2016) (cert petition pending) 
(discussing FWS designation of unoccupied critical habitat for the dusky 
gopher frog).  
82.  See, e.g., INDUS. ECON., INC., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL HABITAT 
DESIGNATION FOR THE ROSWELL SPRINGSNAIL, KOSTER’S SPRINGSNAIL, PECOS 
ASSIMINEA, AND NOEL’S AMPHIPOD ES-1 (2011), https://perma.cc/AVN3-
N9FG; INDUS. ECON., INC., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL HABITAT 
DESIGNATION FOR THE GUNNISON SAGE GROUSE ES-2 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/PY2L-7E98 [hereinafter IEC GUNNISON SAGE GROUSE]. 
83.  See New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 
F.3d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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designation affects behavior. There are two major challenges to 
this approach. First, measuring the costs and benefits of a 
proposed action in a vacuum goes against the White House 
guidance to measure costs and benefits of a proposed action 
against a baseline of what would occur if that action were not 
taken.84 As such, the methodology for economic analysis of 
critical-habitat designation would differ in a major way from 
those used in economic analysis of other major agency actions. 
The second major challenge to measuring costs and benefits 
of critical habitat in isolation is that it would be hard to 
implement. Species are always listed prior to or concurrently with 
critical habitat designation, so there are no examples of areas 
with the adverse modification protection but not the jeopardy and 
take protections. This makes it impossible to directly measure 
how the adverse modification protection in isolation affects 
behavior in the real world. The FWS has attempted to satisfy the 
New Mexico Cattle Growers court by augmenting the standard 
economic analysis of critical habitat designation with additional 
information about the estimated costs and benefits of the 
“baseline,” namely the jeopardy and take protections that come 
with listing the species.85 By doing this, FWS has been able to 
satisfy the court’s requirement to provide a broader picture of the 
costs and benefits of ESA protections while continuing to focus on 
the incremental analysis it uses in other circuits. With the legal 
and practical challenges associated with measuring the effects of 
critical habitat in isolation, it is unlikely that this methodology 
will reemerge in the near future now that FWS has promulgated 
the 2013 rule specifying the incremental method as the preferred 
approach to economic analysis. 
3. Indirect Effects of Critical Habitat 
A third way to measure the increment of protection for 
critical habitat is to estimate how much adverse modification 
protection will affect behavior by looking at empirical evidence of 
how people respond to critical habitat designation. As discussed 
above, people care about critical habitat designation in ways that 
suggest there are real-world consequences of these actions. When 
 
84.  See infra Part III. 
85.  See, e.g., IEC GUNNISON SAGE GROUSE, supra note 82, at 2-2. 
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engaging in Section 7 consultations for the ESA, the FWS and 
NMFS estimate what indirect effects the action may have on 
listed species.86 Indirect effects are things that are “reasonably 
certain to occur” because of an action.87 So if the Federal 
Highway Administration is consulting with the FWS about 
building a new highway that will run near an endangered frog’s 
habitat, the agencies estimate how much the frog will be affected 
directly by road construction and indirectly by development that 
is spurred by the new road. 
Likewise, agencies are charged with estimating indirect 
effects that are “reasonably foreseeable” to occur because of 
proposed actions as part of the NEPA review process.88 Indirect 
effects include “growth-inducing effects and other effects related 
to induced changes in the pattern of land use, population density 
or growth rate, and related effects on air and water and other 
natural systems, including ecosystems.”89 For example, when the 
U.S. Forest Service proposes to lease a plot of land for a new ski 
area, the agency considers how the induced growth of new hotels, 
retail buildings, and housing outside of Forest Service land will 
affect nearby environmental amenities.90 
Since the FWS and NMFS already examine what is 
reasonably expected to occur because of an action when they 
engage in Section 7 consultations and NEPA reviews, the 
agencies already have expertise in making these predictions. 
Estimating the indirect effects of critical-habitat designation does 
not pose the same methodological challenges that plague the 
analysis of critical habitat in isolation because there are real-
world examples of areas that first have only listing protections 
 
86.  See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02(d) (2018). 
87.  U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., 
CONSULTATION HANDBOOK: PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING CONSULTATION 
AND CONFERENCE ACTIVITIES UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES 
ACT 4-29 (1998), https://perma.cc/G748-3EN7. 
88.  WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY & CAL. OFFICE OF PLANNING & 
RESEARCH, NEPA AND CEQA: INTEGRATING FEDERAL AND STATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS 30 (2014), https://perma.cc/NA75-UEVK. 
89.  40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2018). 
90.  See, e.g., U.S.D.A. FOREST SERVICE, BRECKENRIDGE SKI RESORT MULTI-
SEASON RECREATION PROJECTS DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
2-24 (2015), https://perma.cc/9DRN-RTY3.  
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and then add the adverse modification protection.91 In fact, 
economists have already used situations like these to estimate 
how critical habitat affects behavior. As discussed in Section V, 
these estimates can be used as a starting point for measuring the 
increment of protection that comes from critical habitat 
designation. 
III. ACCURATE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS CAN LEAD TO 
MORE EFFECTIVE REGULATIONS 
In this Part, I argue that accurate cost-benefit analysis can 
help achieve win-win results by allowing for more conservation of 
endangered species while also lowering burdens on regulated 
parties. I pull from guidance published by the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”), an office in the 
White House that specializes in economic analysis, and draw 
comparisons to economic analyses of environmental laws 
performed by other agencies such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”). 
A. Economic Analysis to Promote Effective 
Regulations 
Economic analysis, often in the form of cost-benefit analysis, 
has the potential to make regulations more effective by 
encouraging agencies to promulgate rules that have larger 
benefits and smaller costs. Both Republican and Democratic 
presidents have endorsed the idea that economic analysis is an 
important tool for promoting effective regulation.92 Cost-benefit 
analysis was originally introduced by the Reagan administration 
and has been utilized by every administration since.93 President 
Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866 calling for cost-benefit 
 
91.  See, e.g., LOGGERHEAD ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at ES-1 (describing 
the listing of the loggerhead sea turtle in 1978, but critical habitat 
designation not occurring for the Northwest Atlantic Ocean Distinct 
Population Segment until 2014); Critical-Habitat Designations for the 
Northwest Atlantic Ocean Loggerhead Sea Turtle the North Pacific Ocean 
Loggerhead, 79 Fed. Reg. 39,855 (July 10, 2014) (issuing final rule to 
designate critical habitat for the Northwest Atlantic loggerhead sea turtle). 
92.  LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN, EDWARD L. RUBIN, AND KEVIN M. STACK, THE 
REGULATORY STATE 483 (2010). 
93.  Id. 
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analysis of all major federal agency actions whenever possible.94 
Cost-benefit analysis of proposed regulations can ensure that the 
expected benefits are large enough to justify the expected costs.95 
There is not a strict rule that regulations must have positive net 
benefits, but net benefit numbers are seen as indicators of how 
effectively proposed rules will achieve their regulatory goals.96 
The current guidance from OIRA, Circular A-4, explains that 
the goal when estimating impacts of regulation is to measure the 
entire range of costs and benefits that accrue to people in the 
United States from proposed regulations.97 The preferred method 
for measuring benefits of regulation is to use measures of what 
people are willing to pay for improvements in quality of life.98 
Costs are estimated by adding the expected administrative costs 
with the additional burdens on regulated parties.99 
Cost-benefit analysis can help create win-win situations 
because resources can be focused on places where they are most 
effective, leading to more of the desired regulatory outcome with 
lower costs.100 Circular A-4 explains that the goals of economic 
analysis are to “(1) learn if the benefits of an action are likely to 
justify the costs or (2) discover which of various possible 
alternatives would be the most cost-effective.”101 By choosing the 
most cost-effective regulations, agencies are able to achieve better 
regulatory results.102 
To see how this can lead to a win-win outcome, consider a 
hypothetical with an agency that is charged with protecting the 
national tree, the oak.103 This agency has the daunting task of 
figuring out how to protect a national symbol that is important to 
people and ecosystems but that also forms the basis of livelihoods 
from forestry to cooperage of wine barrels. Suppose that the 
 
94.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
95.  Id. 
96.  ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 76, at 149. 
97.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4 
§ E(1) (2003), https://perma.cc/KPV8-M84L [hereinafter CIRCULAR A-4]. 
98.  Id. § E(8). 
99.  Id. § E(2). 
100. See id. § A. 
101. Id. 
102. See id. 
103. Press Release, Arbor Day Found., Oak Becomes America’s National Tree 
(Dec. 10, 2004), https://perma.cc/C2EN-BDV3. 
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agency is interested in pursuing a proposed regulation of X, 
where X could stand for improvement of oak savannah habitat or 
some other agency action. To assess whether proposed regulation 
X to protect oaks is a net benefit to society, the agency can use 
economic analysis. Circular A-4 calls for the agency to clearly lay 
out alternatives to the proposed regulation—for example, policy Y 
that targets improvement of oak savannah habitat on federal 
land and policy Z that is a no-action alternative.104 For each of 
the alternatives, the agency should calculate the expected costs 
and benefits of the action. Once the expected costs are subtracted 
from the expected benefits, the agency has an estimate for the net 
benefit of each alternative. If the expected net benefit of 
regulation X is −$50 million, then the rule may not be in the best 
interest of society. If alternative Y has an expected net benefit of 
$50 million and alternative Z has an expected net benefit of $0, 
then the economic analysis suggests that regulatory policy Y is 
the preferred action. Compared with the original proposal of X, 
policy Y can offer more effective protection of the oak that results 
in more benefits to society at lower costs. By moving forward with 
regulations that focus resources where they are most effective, 
the agency can do a better job at fulfilling its mandate to protect 
our national tree. 
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Other Environmental 
Regulations 
The statutory requirements for the FWS and NMFS to 
consider economic factors in critical habitat designation are 
similar to the calls for economic analysis in the Clean Air Act and 
the Clean Water Act, both drafted and enacted around the same 
time as the ESA.105 For the past thirty years, agencies and courts 
have interpreted this language to mean that agencies should use 
cost-benefit analysis when possible.106 
To measure benefits of proposed regulations, the EPA 
typically relies on studies that evaluate how much a relevant 
 
104. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 97, § A. 
105. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (Clean Air Act analysis provisions for 
new motor vehicle emission standards); 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (same for 
Clean Water Act effluent permits). 
106. See Mortality Risk Valuation, EPA, https://perma.cc/V3KM-WV3H (last 
updated Feb. 8. 2018). 
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population would be willing to pay to achieve a change in 
regulatory outcomes.107 To measure costs of proposed regulations, 
the EPA often relies on data provided by regulated industries to 
estimate the value of the burdens created by the new 
regulations.108 
For example, economic analysis of a proposed change in the 
standard for particulate matter in the air showed that the 
expected benefits of cleaner air and fewer premature fatalities 
caused by pollutants outweigh the expected costs by about forty 
to one.109 Since the EPA administers the program on air 
pollution, it considered an alternative standard that would have 
resulted in higher benefits but also higher costs.110 By using 
economic analysis, the EPA had valuable information to help 
choose between the alternatives. Even when an agency chooses 
an alternative that does not have the highest net benefit, laying 
out the alternatives and considering the costs and benefits of 
them can be a valuable exercise in making thoughtful, 
transparent decisions because the analyses are publicly 
available.111 
This is not to say that cost-benefit analysis is without 
challenge or controversy. Measuring benefits of health and safety 
regulations often involves estimating the value of saving human 
lives, which can be a difficult practice because people are 
fortunately not directly traded on markets.112 Economists 
estimate values of saving lives by looking at market conditions 
like wage premiums for risky jobs and willingness-to-pay for 
safety features in consumer products.113 However, many view 
 
107. EPA, supra note 106; see W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 19 (1992). 
108. See EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 8-13 (2010), 
https://perma.cc/BG8M-5SXY [hereinafter EPA GUIDELINES]. 
109. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE 
NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER 5-71, 
7-12 (2012), https://perma.cc/95H4-LFUQ [hereinafter EPA NAAQS 
ANALYSIS]. 
110. See id. at ES-5, 7; see also EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR 
ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020 2 (2011) https://perma.cc/8RDV-4CZA (finding that 
by 2020 the costs of the 1990 Amendments would reach an annual value of 
$65 billion and the benefits nearly $2 trillion). 
111. See, e.g., EPA NAAQS ANALYSIS, supra note 109. 
112. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 97, § E(8)(b); VISCUSI, supra note 107, at 19–20. 
113. VISCUSI, supra note 107, at 19–20, 34. 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/4
  
332 Pace Environmental Law Review [Vol. 35 
estimating the cost of saving lives as a disrespectful practice 
because it appears to put a price on the value of people.114 
Like the EPA, the agencies that implement the ESA are 
likely to face challenges and controversy when it comes to 
quantifying costs and benefits of proposed regulations. Despite 
these downsides, the FWS and NMFS can benefit from the 
valuable information that is provided by conducting an accurate 
cost-benefit analysis of proposed critical habitat designations. 
IV. MEASURING BENEFITS OF ESA REGULATIONS 
The FWS and NMFS only consider narrow categories of costs 
and benefits of critical habitat. This is a reasonable reading of the 
ESA, but it also risks missing the forest for the trees. This Part 
discusses how broader measures of costs and benefits will lead to 
more accurate cost-benefit analysis that follows the guidance 
provided by OIRA and parallels the practices of other agencies 
that use economic analysis for environmental regulations. 
A. Measuring Costs of Critical Habitat 
The FWS and NMFS estimate that the costs of critical 
habitat are limited to the burdens on the agency to administer 
the areas.115 Economics scholars have argued that there are real 
costs to the ESA, including critical habitat designation. For 
example, Professor Jason Shogren uses economic theory to show 
why there are real costs to critical habitat designation for private 
landowners.116 Economists Jeffrey Zabel and Robert Paterson 
tried to measure the empirical effect of critical habitat 
designation by looking at building permits issued in California 
before and after proposal and designation of critical habitat.117 
They found evidence that builders expect development to be more 
expensive after land becomes critical habitat with a 37-percent 
decrease in the long-run supply of housing permits.118 This 
 
114. See id. at 19–22 (describing criticism of putting values on lives). 
115. See LOGGERHEAD ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at ES-2. 
116. See PRIVATE PROPERTY & THE ESA, supra note 11, at 54–58. 
117. Jeffrey E. Zabel & Robert W. Paterson, The Effects of Critical Habitat 
Designation on Housing Supply: An Analysis of California Housing 
Construction Activity, 46 J. REGIONAL SCI. 67 (2006). 
118. Id. at 68. 
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indicates that, at least on the cost side, the designation of critical 
habitat matters in the market. I use the estimates of the 
magnitude of the costs of critical habitat in Part V to help 
calibrate the scope of benefit estimates. 
Regulated industries and their trade associations tend to 
have strong incentives to quantify the estimated costs of proposed 
regulations and publicize those as part of their efforts to avoid or 
weaken regulatory restrictions.119 When it comes to the ESA and 
critical habitat designation, groups like the American Forest 
Products Association, the American Builders Association, and the 
Oil and Gas Production Alliance are likely to be vocal with their 
(perhaps exaggerated) estimates of the costs.120 Because 
measuring costs is usually more straightforward than measuring 
benefits and there are already well-informed parties that have 
incentives to provide estimates of expected costs, I focus on the 
more vexing issue of how to measure benefits of ESA critical 
habitat. 
B. Measuring Benefit Values of Listed Species 
Following Circular A-4, the starting point for measuring the 
benefits of ESA regulation is to use estimates of what people are 
willing to pay for the survival and recovery of the listed 
species.121 The benefit of the existence and revival of species can 
be measured through willingness-to-pay studies.122 These studies 
use various techniques to elicit from members of a relevant 
 
119. See ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 76, at 156 (describing industry 
incentive to provide cost estimate and perhaps inflate estimates); Everett 
Rosenfeld, Feds Take on Fracking: What Will it Cost Drillers? CNBC 
(March 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/259U-2HFH (example of industry 
groups publicizing cost estimates in the popular media). 
120. See Salzman, supra note 20, at 335–37; see also Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n 
v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1216 
(2011) (upholding FWS’s designation of critical habitat despite industry 
challenge to designation’s economic impact); Home Builders Ass’n of N. 
Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(finding FWS’s  critical-habitat designation valid despite industry 
allegation that designation “failed to properly account for the economic 
impact . . . “). 
121. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 97, § E(2). 
122. See Leslie Richardson & John Loomis, The Total Economic Value of 
Threatened, Endangered and Rare Species: An Updated Meta-Analysis, 68 
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1535, 1535, 1539 (2008). 
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population how much they value a change in regulatory 
outcomes. When species are commercially valuable, such as 
salmon, estimates of benefits can be based on market prices.123 
More often, however, species are not traded on markets, and 
benefit estimates are derived using other methods.124 Travel-cost 
studies look at how much people are willing to pay to travel to a 
particular place to have an experience interacting with a natural 
feature, such as how much a family is willing to pay to experience 
a whale sightseeing tour.125 Willingness-to-pay for travel can be 
used to quantify how much people value the experience of seeing 
the whales.126 This can give researchers a sense for how much 
people value the existence and success of the species itself.127 
Stated-preference studies use surveys to ask people from 
relevant populations how much they are willing to pay for 
changes in regulatory outcomes.128 Stated-preference studies 
have the benefit of being flexible and allowing researchers to 
capture values for a range of species and scenarios, but the 
studies require careful attention to details like wording of 
questions.129 Otherwise, estimates can vary greatly with small 
changes in methodology.130 Despite this drawback, stated-
preference surveys are the most common way to measure benefits 
of endangered species because they are the only way to capture 
values for some species.131 For example, there are no market 
 
123. Id. at 1539, 1541. 
124. E.g., id. at 1539 (another method includes benefit transfer). 
125. See Matthew J. Kotchen & Stephen D. Reiling, Estimating and 
Questioning Economic Values for Endangered Species: An Application and 
Discussion, 15 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 77, 79 (1998). 
126. See John Loomis, Shizuka Yorizane & Doug Larson, Testing Significance of 
Multi-Destination and Multi-Purpose Trip Effects in a Travel Cost Method 
Demand Model for Whale Watching Trips, 29 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 
REV. 183 (2000).  
127. See id. 
128. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 97, § E(4) (“The distinguishing feature of [stated-
preference studies] is that hypothetical questions about use or non-use 
values are posed to survey respondents in order to obtain willingness-to-
pay estimates relevant to benefit or cost estimation.”). 
129. See id.  
130. Natural Resource Damage Assessments Under the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990 – Appendix I: Report of the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation, 58 
Fed. Reg. 4601, 4603–04 (Jan. 15, 1993) [hereinafter NOAA Panel Report]. 
131. See Luke M. Brander et al., The Empirics of Wetland Valuation: A 
Comprehensive Summary and a Meta-Analysis of the Literature, 33 ENVTL. 
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prices to signal the value of a commercially worthless species that 
people will never encounter. Yet those same people may care 
about the existence of a bird in the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge that fits this description, even if they never plan to travel 
there.132 If people care enough about that bird to pay money for 
its protection, then those values should count as benefits of 
regulatory protections for the bird.133 
Economists have estimated values of benefits for over forty 
different species.134 The average respondent in the studies was 
willing to pay an amount (in 2003 dollars) ranging from roughly 
$10 to save the Atlantic salmon in Maine to over $200 to prevent 
the extinction of the humpback whale.135 These studies can be 
used to calculate benefit values of protecting the species by 
extrapolating the survey responses over the relevant 
populations.136 
Existing studies that measure willingness-to-pay for species 
protection provide starting points to estimate the benefits of 
protecting a species’ critical habitat. Although a new study for 
each species is ideal to estimate the benefits of protecting species, 
this can be cost and time prohibitive.137 Fortunately, it is not 
necessary to conduct a new study for each species in each specific 
location; benefits transfer measures can lead to reasonable 
estimates of benefits of saving species that have not been directly 
studied.138 OIRA’s Circular A-4 recommends estimating benefits 
by using transfer calculations, which provide systematic ways to 
 
& RESOURCE ECON. 223, 228–29 (2006) (describing estimating benefits of 
wetlands, which share many of the challenges—like a lack of observable 
market behavior—as measuring benefits of endangered species). 
132. See Kotchen, supra note 125, at 78 (discussing how individuals derive 
“nonuse” value from simply knowing that a species is protected despite not 
having any live interaction with the species). 
133. Id. at 78–79. 
134. KRISTY WALLMO, NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., THREATENED AND 
ENDANGERED SPECIES VALUATION: LITERATURE REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT 1 
(2002). 
135. Id. at 7–10. 
136. See Robert J. Johnston et al., Contemporary Guidance for Stated Preference 
Studies, 4 J. ASS’N ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 319, 341 (2017). 
137. EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 86 (2000). 
138. Id. But see CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 97, § E(5) (stating that transfer 
benefits have a greater chance of uncertainty and should be used as a last 
resort with explicit justification).  
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gather estimates from different contexts and use them to 
estimate benefits in a new context.139 
C. Measuring Benefits Values of Habitats with 
Ecosystem Services 
This section describes the importance of implementing 
economic analysis with a broad sense of benefits. Benefits of 
endangered species are not limited to the values people place on 
the listed species themselves, however. The ESA is intended to 
protect endangered species and the habitats upon which they 
depend.140 The benefits of these protections should not be limited 
to the benefits of the species that are listed under the ESA; when 
ecosystems are conserved because of the ESA, the benefits that 
flow from those ecosystems to people should all be counted as 
benefits of the regulation. For critical-habitat designation, this 
can be done by using measures of ecosystem services like water 
filtration and carbon sequestration.141 
One way to interpret the language of the ESA is to consider 
the economic benefits that flow from the listed species and the 
ecosystems that are conserved because of the listed species. The 
conflict between loggers and environmentalists in the Pacific 
Northwest is not just about the listed Northern Spotted Owl; it is 
also about how we choose to balance economic values of 
harvesting old-growth timber versus the values of preserving 
these ecosystems that are unlikely to reappear if destroyed. There 
is an imbalance in current valuation techniques where the full 
economic value of harvesting timber is measured but the value of 
protecting the old-growth forest is limited to the benefits that 
accrue to a few rare species. A reasonable way to gauge the 
benefits of endangered species and their habitats is to use 
economic valuation tools from other fields. Ecologists think of the 
 
139. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 97, § E(5) (explaining that benefit transfer 
involves transferring existing costs and benefits from other original studies 
and applying data in a new context). 
140. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2018) (“The purpose[] of [the ESA is] to provide a 
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and 
threatened species depend may be conserved . . . .). 
141. See Claude Gascon et al., The Importance and Benefits of Species, 25 
CURRENT BIOLOGY 431, 433 (2015) (describing unexpected benefits, such as 
water filtration and carbon sequestration, of protecting species and their 
habitats). 
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benefits that flow from ecosystems to people as ecosystem 
services.142 Economists use various techniques to put values on 
these streams of services.143 Using existing estimates of 
ecosystem services, the FWS and NMFS can start to quantify the 
benefits from the ecosystems upon which endangered species 
depend. 
When the EPA evaluates benefits of air or water regulations, 
it measures the benefits of reducing the pollutant at issue.144 The 
agency also measures the benefits of lowering co-pollutants—
other pollutants that are not the direct subject of a regulation but 
that are nevertheless predicted to decrease due to the 
regulation.145 For example, with air regulations to limit emissions 
of NO2 we also see drops in particulate matter and ground-level 
ozone.146 Thus, the EPA estimates the benefits of lives saved both 
from reduced NOx and from reduced ozone.147 
The FWS and NMFS should follow suit and measure co-
benefits of conservation efforts to capture the full range of 
benefits of critical habitat designation. They have done this a few 
times in the past when multiple listed species have overlapping 
critical habitats, like with the Spotted Owl and salmon in the 
Pacific Northwest.148 But this still fails to capture all the benefits 
of the regulations, just as the EPA failing to consider reductions 
in co-pollutants would not capture the full range of benefits for 
regulations that reduce NOx. The most accurate way to record 
benefits of critical habitat protection is to measure the benefits of 
critical habitat to listed species but also factor in a category of 
benefits from the conserved ecosystems. 
The most promising way to measure benefits of critical 
habitat designation is to use metrics of ecosystem services—
 
142. James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 887–88 
(1997). 
143. For a survey of such valuation techniques, see Richardson & Loomis, supra 
note 126, at 1535, 1539. 
144. See, e.g., EPA GUIDELINES, supra note 108, at 7-3 to 7-4 (describing how to 
determine benefit categories of standard EPA regulations).  
145. EPA, FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (RIA) FOR THE NO2 NATIONAL 
AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS (NAAQS) 4-15 (2010), 
https://perma.cc/Q8YK-Z8VS. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. See NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 2-4.  
30https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/4
  
338 Pace Environmental Law Review [Vol. 35 
carbon sequestration, water filtration and retention, and 
recreational values of critical habitat—in addition to the 
existence values of the species themselves. These services greatly 
benefit people who enjoy clean air, filtered water, and scenic 
vistas.149 Professor Gretchen Daily and others have quantified 
the value of some of these ecosystem services by combining 
economic and ecological tools.150 Agencies can use these 
previously published valuations for ecosystem services to provide 
an estimate of the benefits that flow because of the protection of 
critical habitat for endangered species. Going forward, agencies 
can also encourage more valuation efforts of other ecosystem 
service benefits. 
Not all of the benefits from ecosystems designated as critical 
habitat should be counted as benefits of such designation. Taken 
to an extreme, that estimate would approach the property value 
of the entire critical habitat areas. Paradoxically, if the 
government considers all of these values as conservation benefits, 
it would sometimes also have to count those same values as 
regulation costs because private landowners would be deprived of 
other intended uses of the property.151 But this paradox is 
avoided if only the benefit of additional conservation from critical-
habitat designation for the endangered species is considered.152 
Measuring the benefits of an old-growth ecosystem in the 
Pacific Northwest is not a simple accounting task because most of 
these benefits are not traded on markets with prices.153 
Sometimes economists can estimate how those ecosystem services 
are used in production of goods and services in the market.154 
 
149. See Gascon et al., supra note 141, at 433–34. 
150. See NATURAL CAPITAL: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MAPPING ECOSYSTEM 
SERVICES 213 (Gretchen C. Daily et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter NATURAL 
CAPITAL]. 
151. See Richard A. Epstein, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapters of Oregon: The 
Law and Economics of Habitat Preservation, 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 19–
20 (1997) (explaining how the protection of endangered species and critical 
habitat under the ESA could preempt local zoning authority by limiting 
control over private and public development projects). 
152. See Seiber v. United States, 364 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting a 
takings claim against FWS’s rejection of petitioner’s incidental take permit 
pursuant to FWS’s designation of 40 out of petitioner’s 200 acres of land as 
critical habitat). 
153. See Gascon et al, supra note 141, at 431. 
154. See NATURAL CAPITAL, supra note 150, at 44. 
31
  
2018] Accurate Economics to Protect Endangered Species 339 
This can allow for backing out valuations that are based on 
market prices.155 So for something like water filtration, 
economists might look at clean water as an input of industries 
that rely on water, such as agriculture, manufacturing, and 
recreation.156 One of the ways to value something like water 
filtration is to look at what it would cost to filter it with human 
technology.157 Ecosystem services can also be valued with stated-
preference studies, much like the benefits of species existence.158 
Economists have used such studies to estimate the values of 
carbon sequestration, water filtration, and a range of other 
services. For example, Professor Edward Barbier has estimated 
and critiqued valuations of ecosystem services for coastal 
wetlands determined using stated-preference studies.159 
By accurately measuring the costs and benefits of critical 
habitat, the FWS and NMFS can focus conservation efforts on 
proposed actions that achieve high net benefits to society. This 
suggestion is more than a pipe dream because existing estimates 
of the values of species and ecosystem services can be used to 
improve the accuracy of economic analysis in the short term. In 
the long term, additional studies can provide more data points to 
allow for accurate quantification of costs and benefits for 
additional species and situations. 
V. EXAMPLE: CRITICAL HABITAT FOR 
LOGGERHEAD TURTLES 
This Part provides an example of how to implement the 
proposed benefit measures by examining the recent economic 
analysis for the Northwest Atlantic population segment of 
loggerhead turtles. As discussed below, the NMFS estimates the 
benefits of designating critical habitat along almost one third of 
the Atlantic coast of the United States to be approximately zero. I 
use existing estimates of the benefits of protecting the turtle and 
the value of ecosystem services provided by the critical habitat to 
calculate a more accurate estimate of the benefits that flow from 
 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. See id. 
159. See Edward B. Barbier, Valuing Ecosystem Services for Coastal Wetland 
Protection and Restoration, 2 RESOURCES 213 (2013). 
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critical habitat designation. I estimate benefits of critical habitat 
designation for the North Atlantic population segment of 
loggerhead turtles to be at least $106 million per year. 
A. Current FWS Economic Analysis 
Critical habitat consists of “specific areas” that are “essential 
to the conservation of the species.”160 In the case of the 
loggerhead turtle, critical habitat includes the scenic coastal 
islands described above and the species of those islands that are 
connected to loggerhead turtles through the complex web of 
life.161 Loggerhead turtles also rely on the shallow waters and 
bays scattered along much of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the 
United States, so these marine ecosystems are proposed for 
designation as critical habitat by the NMFS.162 Also included in 
NMFS’s proposal for critical-habitat designation are the mid-
ocean plateaus near which loggerhead turtles find much of their 
food.163 In total, about half of the coastal zone of the Southeast is 
proposed critical habitat for loggerhead turtles under either FWS 
or NMFS control.164 Therefore, much area and many important 
ecosystems are critical habitat for loggerhead turtles. However, 
since the incremental approach only looks at the costs and 
benefits of protections above a baseline of protections for listed 
species, the estimated benefits of loggerhead turtle critical 
habitat are negligible.165 
The FWS estimates the costs of critical habitat by looking at 
the expected administrative burdens of protecting critical 
habitat.166 For the loggerhead turtle, this amounts to about 
 
160. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (2018). 
161. See LOGGERHEAD ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 1-6. 
162. See id. at ES-6 to 7. 
163. See id. at ES-6. 
164. See id. at 1-12 to 13. For species like the loggerhead turtle that pass 
through both marine and coastal environments during their life cycles, the 
FWS and NMFS coordinate their regulation in ways that are in the best 
interests of the species. See JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, J.B. RUHL & KALYANA 
ROBBINS, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 141–42 
(2013); see also MOU Between the EPA, FWS, and NMFS Regarding 
Enhanced Coordination Under the Clean Water Act and the ESA, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 11,202, 11,208 (Feb. 22, 2001). 
165. See discussion of the incremental approach supra p. 316–20. 
166. See LOGGERHEAD ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at ES-7. 
33
  
2018] Accurate Economics to Protect Endangered Species 341 
$110,000 per year.167 Benefits are estimated to be unclear but 
negligible because there is considerable overlap between 
protections of listed species and critical habitat.168 Hypothetical 
benefits are mentioned and described qualitatively but are not 
quantified.169 
B. More Accurate Economic Analysis of Loggerhead 
Turtle Critical Habitat 
As discussed in Part IV, there are advantages to measuring 
costs and benefits of proposed regulations using methods that 
accurately reflect how society values the expected changes due to 
the regulation. A more accurate estimate of the benefits of critical 
habitat for the loggerhead turtle adds the values of better 
outcomes for loggerhead turtle to values of other ecosystem 
services that are preserved or improved by the critical habitat 
designation. 
There are two existing studies of willingness-to-pay for 
conservation of loggerhead turtles. Wallmo and Lew use a stated 
preference choice experiment on a national representative sample 
to estimate a household willingness to pay of $48.75 (in 2018 
dollars) per year to have loggerhead turtles recover to the point of 
not needing endangered or threatened status.170 Aggregated over 
roughly 117 million households in the United States,171 this leads 
to a total annual benefit of nearly $5.7 billion. Since the North 
Atlantic population segment has 41.8% of the world’s loggerhead 
turtles,172 the benefit of saving the relevant population segment 
of loggerheads is $2.4 billion per year. 
Whitehead uses a contingent valuation model that accounts 
for uncertainty in recovery status of loggerhead turtles, finding 
that the median North Carolina household is willing to make a 
 
167. Id. 
168. See id. at ES-10. 
169. See id.  
170. Kristy Wallmo & Daniel K. Lew, Public Willingness to Pay for Recovering 
and Downlisting Threatened and Endangered Marine Species, 26 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 830, 836 tbl.3 (2012) (expressing values in 2011 
dollars). 
171. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES QUICKFACTS (2017), 
https://perma.cc/3Y9Z-A8Y7. 
172. Caretta caretta (Loggerhead Turtle), IUCN RED LIST, at tbl.2 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/3QXY-2CYR.  
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one-time payment of $59.62 to reduce the probability of extinction 
to zero for the next twenty-five years for loggerhead turtles.173 
Assuming this response can be extrapolated to the other states 
that include loggerhead critical habitat, this leads to an 
estimated willingness to pay for loggerhead turtles of $1.14 
billion, or $45.6 million per year.174 Taken together, the studies 
indicate a substantial range of willingness-to-pay estimates for 
loggerhead turtles from $45.6 million per year to $1.8 billion per 
year. To address concerns that stated preference studies may 
tend to overestimate willingness-to-pay,175 I use the lower 
estimate in the range. 
As discussed in Part IV, the benefits of critical habitat 
designation should not be limited to the listed species but should 
also include benefits of ecosystem services of the critical habitat. 
Economists, often teamed with ecologists, have estimated 
valuations of ecosystem services for wetlands using stated-
preference studies.176 Costanza et al. estimate that the ecosystem 
service of reducing storm surge provides an annual benefit of 
approximately $9,671 per hectare of coastal wetland.177 With 
approximately 282,426 hectares of coastal wetlands in the states 
covered by the loggerhead analysis,178 this amounts to $2.7 billion 
in annual benefits. Sandy intertidal beaches provide the 
ecosystem service of stabilizing sediment,179 which Huang et al. 
estimated to be worth around $5.45 annually per household per 
mile of shore.180 The loggerhead analysis covers 1,300 miles of 
 
173. John C. Whitehead, Ex Ante Willingness to Pay with Supply and Demand 
Uncertainty: Implications for Valuing a Sea Turtle Protection Programme, 
24 APPLIED ECON. 981, 984 (1992) (estimating willingness to pay as $33.22 
in 1992 dollars, converted to 2018 dollars using the Consumer Price Index). 
174. $59.62 per household × 19.1 million housing units in North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Alabama. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
supra note 171. 
175. See NOAA Panel Report, supra note 130, at 4603–04. 
176. See Barbier, supra note 159. 
177. Robert Costanza et al, The Value of Coastal Wetlands for Hurricane 
Protection, 37 AMBIO 241, 245 (2008) (Table 3 estimate of mean value of 
$8,236 per hectare in 2008 dollars converted to 2018 dollars using the 
Consumer Price Index). 
178. Id. (using wetland area of the average storm swath for Alabama, Florida, 
Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina from Table 3). 
179. W.J. MITSCH & J.G. GOSSELINK, WETLANDS AND COASTS 166 (3d ed. 2000). 
180. Ju-Chin Huang, P. Joan Poor & Min Qiang Zhao, Economic Valuation of 
Beach Erosion Control, 22 MARINE RESOURCE ECON. 221, 235 (2007) (listing 
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beaches and 19.1 million households, resulting in $135 million in 
annual benefits. 
But not all of these turtles, beaches, and wetlands would be 
destroyed without critical habitat designation, so we must 
determine how much would have been protected in a no-action 
alternative. As discussed in Part II, the increment of protections 
of critical habitat has to be measured against the baseline of what 
would have been protected in a no-action alternative.181 The 
Zabel and Paterson results discussed in Part IV suggest that 
critical habitat designation can lead to a 37% drop in construction 
activity.182 Although this estimate is looking at the cost side of 
critical habitat designation, there is a close link between the 
opportunity costs of foregone development and the benefits of 
preserving an area as critical habitat. Namely, foregone 
development is likely to result in more natural environments and 
vice versa. Using this as a rough proxy of the impact of critical 
habitat on conservation behavior and discounting by a factor of 
ten because not all development will result in complete 
destruction of coastal amenities, I estimate that 3.7% of the 
values discussed above would be protected because of critical 
habitat designation. This results in a preliminary estimate of the 
benefits of critical habitat designation for loggerhead turtles in 
the Southeast of $106 million per year.183 
As studies provide valuations of additional services like 
shoreline recreation, the estimates of benefits can include those 
quantified ecosystem services as well. For now, the benefit 
measures can be thought of as lower bounds on the measures of 
benefits that flow from critical habitat. The estimate of $106 
million per year of critical habitat for the North Atlantic 
population segment of loggerhead turtle more accurately reflects 
 
their preferred estimate for economic benefit per mile per household as 
$4.45 in 2007 dollars, converted to 2018 dollars using the Consumer Price 
Index). 
181. See supra Part II.D.  
182. See Zabel & Paterson, supra note 117, at 68. 
183. This was calculated by summing the conservative estimated benefit of 
saving loggerhead turtles ($45.6 million per year), the estimated benefit of 
reduced storm surge ($2.7 billion per year), and the estimated benefit of 
shore stabilization ($135 million per year), and then multiplying that sum 
by the estimated protection factor afforded by critical-habitat designation 
(0.037).  
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social preferences for turtles and benefits of coastal areas than 
the FWS estimate of approximately zero benefit for this 
designation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Part concludes with a discussion of how accurate 
economic analysis of critical habitat designation can help improve 
the discourse about the ESA by focusing the discussion on the 
tradeoffs that are at the heart of the Act. 
As discussed above, the FWS and NMFS should engage in 
more accurate economic analysis when designating critical 
habitat under the ESA—it is a better fit with the language of the 
statute and can help lead to more effective regulations. Following 
these suggestions would put the FWS and NMFS more in line 
with White House guidance and practices of other agencies that 
implement environmental laws. FWS and NMFS have made 
policy choices to 1) only consider incremental effects of critical 
habitat; and 2) value only the benefits that come from the listed 
species themselves. I argue that the agencies should reverse 
course on these two policies and promulgate a new rule that 
establishes a methodology of economic analysis that fulfills 
Congress’s call to consider economic factors when designating 
critical habitat.184 Benefits should be measured by looking at the 
value of listed species and the value of ecosystem services 
protected through critical habitat designation. 
As seen with the example of the economic analysis of the 
loggerhead turtle, the tools for more accurate economic analysis 
are within reach. Current practices of the FWS and NMFS do not 
accurately capture the real costs and broad benefits that reflect 
social feelings about the tradeoff between conservation and 
development. Additionally, economic analysis can be a tool that 
allows the FWS and NMFS to keep conserving beautiful places 
but remove the worst of the burdens on landowners. By focusing 
first on regulations that provide large net benefits, the agencies 
can avoid some of the extreme results that prompt pushback to 
the ESA. 
Climate change is likely to increase the stakes of endangered 
species regulation by straining both ecological and economic 
 
184. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2018). 
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systems. With this additional stress, it will be crucial for the FWS 
and NMFS to be able to point to how their proposed regulations 
are benefiting society. Although some find it distasteful to try to 
put a price on nature, failing to do so often means that only 
opponents of conservation have numbers to wave in front of 
Congressional committees and the press. If the agencies that 
implement the ESA engage in accurate cost-benefit analysis, all 
sides of the argument can have more information to use when 
making decisions about how to best balance the conservation of 
resources against other social goals. Agency actions can be more 
transparent by clearly laying out proposed actions, alternatives, 
and estimated costs and benefits. 
All of these factors can help improve the discourse about the 
ESA by shifting from arguments about owls versus jobs to 
meaningful discussions about how to use ecosystems that are 
critical to improving outcomes for species and provide valuable 
products and services to people. Both the turtles and tourists on 
the beach can better enjoy the beautiful landscapes of Cape 
Hatteras—and hundreds of other places in the United States—
with the help of accurate economic analysis that promotes 
effective protection of critical habitats. 
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